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An ongoing and highly politicised debate concerns the relative efficacy of cash transfers versus food aid. This paper aims to shed light on this debate, 
drawing on new empirical evidence from Ethiopia’s 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). Our data derive 
from a two-wave panel survey conducted in 2006 and 
2008. Ethiopia has experienced unprecedented rates of 
inflation since 2007, which have reduced the real 
purchasing power of PSNP cash payments. Our regression 
findings confirm that food transfers or ‘cash plus food’ 
packages are superior to cash transfers alone – they 
enable higher levels of income growth, livestock accu-
mulation and self-reported food security. These results 
raise questions of fundamental importance to global 
humanitarian response and social protection policy. We 
draw out some implications for the design of social 
transfer programmes and describe some steps that could 
be taken to enable ‘predictable transfers to meet predict-
able needs’
Introduction
The rapidly evolving social protection agenda has been 
closely associated with the delivery of ‘predictable cash 
transfers’ to large numbers of people in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America (Farrington and Slater 2006; Devereux and 
Sabates-Wheeler 2007). In many programmes, cash trans-
fers are given unconditionally, but in others they are 
conditional on the uptake of social services (education, 
health) or the provision of labour (public works), with 
the aim of changing behaviour or creating productive 
infrastructure, to facilitate sustainable exits from poverty. 
Recent debates have focused on whether conditionality 
affects behaviour and outcomes more positively than 
unconditional cash transfers (Molyneux 2007), and 
whether public works actually create economically useful 
assets (McCord 2008). An ongoing and highly politicised 
debate concerns the relative efficacy of cash versus food 
aid. Numerous cash transfer programmes have now been 
implemented across the world, but the ‘cash/food debate’ 
remains unresolved, and has been given fresh impetus 
and urgency by the recent global food price crisis (Benson 
et al. 2008).
Typically, cash transfers are set at a level sufficient to 
purchase a basket of commodities in local markets. These 
commodities are usually restricted to basic food items 
–sometimes just a quantity of the staple cereal (e.g. a 
50kg bag of maize or rice), sometimes equivalent to a 
standard food aid ration (e.g. 20kg of maize, 4kg of beans, 
1 litre of cooking oil) – but occasionally include other 
goods and services (e.g. groceries, school fees or a contri-
bution towards health costs). Unless delivered in the form 
of a commodity-denominated voucher, there is no restric-
tion on what recipients can purchase with the cash, 
though they are often sensitised about the purpose of 
the programme, which is invariably to protect subsis-
tence food consumption in poor households.
Two questions arise immediately. Firstly, what prices 
are used to set the cash transfer level? Food prices can 
vary substantially between global and domestic markets, 
and within countries. Secondly, what happens if these 
prices change significantly after the cash transfer level 
is set? Prices can increase due to general price inflation, 
seasonal cycles, or ‘price spikes’ associated with famines. 
Sceptics have used the recent global food crisis to argue 
that cash transfers are inappropriate in weak economies, 
pointing to the inability of many large-scale programmes 
to increase cash payment rates in line with price rises.
In fact, several innovative responses to food price vari-
ability have been observed in recent cash transfer 
programmes in Africa. In Swaziland’s Emergency Drought 
Relief (EDR) programme in 2007/08, social transfers were 
delivered half in cash and half in food. In Lesotho’s Cash 
and Food Transfers Pilot Project (CFTPP) in 2007/08, a lag 
between price monitoring and response resulted in 
declining transfer value, until a once-off adjustment of 
25% was made towards the end of the five-month inter-
vention. In Malawi’s Food and Cash Transfers (FACT) 
project in 2005/06 and Dowa Emergency Cash Transfers 
(DECT) project in 2006/07, transfers were index-linked 
to local food prices, and were adjusted before each 
monthly disbursement (Devereux 2008).
This paper aims to shed further light on the cash/food 
debate, drawing on empirical evidence from Ethiopia’s 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). Our data derive 
from a new dataset – a two-wave panel survey of PSNP 
beneficiaries and a non-beneficiary control group, 
conducted in 2006 and 2008. Data was collected prior 
to the roll-out of the programme, so we use the two 
waves to estimate the programme effect of additional 
two years. Specifically, we estimate, econometrically, a 
growth regression model to compare the impacts of 
different payment modalities. Ethiopia has experienced 
unprecedented rates of inflation since 2007, which have 
reduced the real purchasing power of (un-indexed) PSNP 
cash payments. In this context, our findings confirm that 
food transfers or ‘cash plus food’ packages are superior 
to cash transfers – they enable higher levels of income 
growth, asset accumulation and self-reported food secu-
rity. These results raise questions of fundamental impor-
tance to global humanitarian response and social 
protection policy. Can cash transfers be agile enough to 
respond to dramatic price rises (or even regular food 
price seasonality)? Do policy-makers have the budgetary 
flexibility to index-link cash transfers and adjust them 
frequently – perhaps even monthly? What is the appro-
priate mix of cash and food transfers in contexts of unpre-
dictable and volatile food prices?
The Cash/Food Debate
The ‘cash or food?’ debate has a long history in both the 
humanitarian relief and social protection discourses. Until 
recently, this choice was more often driven by availability 
of resources than an objective assessment of needs – 
donors had food surpluses to disburse – and by pejorative 
‘elite perceptions’ of poor people as incapable of 
managing cash responsibly. During the 1990s, the tech-
nical debate revolved around identifying the advantages 
and disadvantages of cash versus food transfers, and the 
conditions under which one should be chosen over the 
other (see Table 1). Food aid was increasingly criticised 
for being expensive to ship, store and distribute, 
competing unfairly with local production and trade, and 
being inflexible and paternalistic (Barrett and Maxwell 
2005). By contrast, cash transfers were seen as cost-effi-
cient to deliver, incentivising agricultural production and 
market activity, and allowing recipients to meet a range 
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of food and non-food needs (Creti and Jaspars 2006; 
Gelan 2006; Harvey 2007). At a theoretical level, the case 
for cash transfers builds on Sen’s analysis of ‘entitlement 
to food’ (Sen 1981), which argues that restoring access 
to food by boosting demand is a more effective and 
sustainable response to food insecurity – but only if 
markets are well functioning – than is delivering food 
aid.
As the cash transfers lobby gained momentum in the 
early 2000s, the advantages of food transfers and the 
disadvantages of cash tended to be overlooked 
(Devereux 2006; Gentilini 2007). For example, food trans-
fers are often controlled by women and benefit children 
directly, while cash is more likely to be controlled by 
men and can be diverted to various uses, not all of which 
benefit women and children (Table 1). Crucially, cash 
transfers are vulnerable to price inflation of the commod-
ities they are intended to purchase. In contexts where 
supplies are constrained and traders are slow to respond 
to demand signals, injecting cash transfers might even 
exacerbate inflation. This risk was highlighted when 
global commodity prices surged in 2007/08 (Benson et 
al. 2008; Tangermann 2008), undermining the purchasing 
power of people on low incomes and those who depend 
on cash-based transfers.
In one sense the ‘cash/food debate’ remains unre-
solved – cash transfers and food aid can often be found 
within the same country, sometimes even within the 
same humanitarian relief or social protection programme 
(Ethiopia’s PSNP being a case in point). On the other 
hand, perhaps this represents a kind of reconciliation. 
Government and donor positions are certainly less 
entrenched than they were a few years ago. Many 
governments are now adopting cash transfers for social 
protection interventions, or even for emergency relief 
purposes. Large multilateral food donors (notably the 
World Food Programme) are piloting cash transfers, and 
advocates of cash transfers (e.g. the UK’s Department 
for International Development) recognise that food aid 
continues to have an important role, especially in 
contexts of commodity market failure.
PSNP overview
The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was 
launched by the Government of Ethiopia, with donor 
support, in January 2005. The PSNP is the largest social 
transfer programme in Africa outside South Africa, 
reaching approximately 11% of the national population 
in 2006 (8.3 million out of 71 million people). Responses 
to food insecurity in Ethiopia had been dominated for 
decades by emergency food aid, which was mobilised 
for over five million Ethiopians every year between 1994 
and 2003. Recognising that a large component of this 
food insecurity is ‘chronic’ rather than ‘transitory’, and 
that decades of food aid have had no discernible impact 
on reducing rural poverty and vulnerability, the PSNP 
represents an innovative attempt to tackle chronic food 
insecurity and break Ethiopia’s dependence on food 
aid.
The PSNP aims to provide ‘predictable transfers to 
meet predictable needs.’ Chronically food insecure 
households should receive support for six months each 
year for up to five years, bridging their annual food 
consumption gap, protecting their assets against 
‘distress sales’ and building their resilience against 
shocks. Transfers are delivered through two compo-
nents. The ‘Public Works Programme’ provides temporary 
employment to the majority of PSNP participants (84% 
in 2008), on rural infrastructure projects such as road 
construction. ‘Direct Support’ delivers unconditional 
transfers to the minority of participants (16% in 2008) 
in households with no able-bodied members. 
Complementary programmes such as ‘livelihood pack-
ages’ should generate secondary streams of income, 
until the household is assessed as ‘food sufficient’ and 
ready to ‘graduate’ from dependence on transfers. 
Although emergency relief would continue to be 
required in years of severe shocks, if the PSNP is successful 
then millions of people would be removed from the 
annual emergency appeal process, and there would be 
a gradual shift towards a flexible multi-year safety net 
that expands and contracts according to need.
Importantly, another ambition of the PSNP was “to 
shift the financing of the programme from food aid to 
cash” (GFDRE 2004b: 1). This was more than a signal of 
the government’s intent to phase out non-emergency 
food aid; it also recognised the developmental potential 
of cash transfers. “Through the provision of cash transfers 
rather than food, the programme will enable small-
holders to increase consumption and investment levels 
and stimulate the development of rural markets” (DFID 
Ethiopia 2005: 1). Initially, cash transfers were not intro-
duced universally throughout the PSNP. The Programme 
Implementation Manual identified three preconditions 
for disbursing cash transfers.
Table 1. Cash versus food transfers: advantages 
and disadvantages 
Food Cash
Advantages
Donor food surpluses  •
are available
Immediately increases  •
food availability
Directly addresses  •
nutritional deficits
Can be self-targeting •
Usage favours women,  •
children, older persons
Lower security risk •
More cost-efficient  •
than food
Allows more  •
beneficiary choice
More fungible than  •
food
Encourages  •
production
Stimulates the  •
market
Disadvantages
High transport and  •
storage costs
Losses from spoilage  •
and theft
Less easily exchanged  •
than cash
Disincentive effects on  •
production
Competes with local  •
markets and trade
Limited donor  •
resources are 
available
Losses from inflation •
Can be used for  •
non-food 
consumption
More difficult to  •
target
Usage favours men •
Heightened security  •
risk
Source: Devereux 2002: 12
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“Food is available for purchase in the local market (or  •
traders, service cooperatives can be relied on to bring 
food in if people have cash to buy it);
The local market will not be unduly distorted by the  •
influx of cash, or the effects would be less detrimental 
than an influx of food; and
The woreda administration has the required support  •
systems in place (for transferring/ depositing funds, 
accounting and auditing)” (GFDRE 2006: 45).
Before the programme was launched an assessment 
was made of the administrative capacity of each district 
(or woreda), specifically in terms of their ability to handle 
large amounts of cash, and local markets were assessed 
for their capacity to respond to the incremental demand 
pressure that cash injections into poor rural communities 
would create. District administrations were also required 
to consult local people for their preferences for cash or 
food. Cash was disbursed to participants in ‘high capacity’ 
woredas with well functioning markets, while food was 
disbursed in ‘low capacity’ woredas with weak 
markets.
Chronic food insecurity at the woreda and households 
level is a defining feature of the eligibility criteria for PSNP 
participation. The household must have faced continuous 
food shortages (usually 3 months of food gap or more) 
in the last 3 years and received food assistance. The other 
criteria are: households that suddenly become more 
vulnerable as a result of a severe loss of assets and are 
unable to support themselves; and, households without 
family support and other means of social protection and 
support.
Some district administrations considered disbursing 
a mix of transfers – e.g. 30% food and 70% cash in Meket 
woreda, 50/50 in Sekota woreda – but Meket settled on 
100% cash following a favourable market assessment, 
while Sekota opted for 100% food “because of concerns 
about the availability of food in local markets” (Kebede 
2006: 587). Nonetheless, the expectation was that cash 
transfers would gradually displace food transfers in all 
woredas as administrative capacity and markets strength-
ened, and as the expected positive impacts from cash 
woredas generated confidence and lessons for the wider 
programme.
“As woredas develop more capacity, they will move 
towards improving the integration of safety net plans 
into Woreda Development Plans, implementing more 
effective safety net activities and increasing the share of 
transfers provided to households in cash versus food as 
appropriate” (GFDRE 2006: 4).
Food price inflation and 
declining real value of PSNP 
cash transfers
Especially in contexts where markets are thin and imper-
fectly integrated, cash transfers are vulnerable to food 
price rises that erode their real value. This can occur for 
one of three reasons. The first is that injections of cash 
transfers could create an imbalance between demand 
and supply, which in itself drives up prices. The second 
is price seasonality, The third source is general consumer 
price inflation, which could range in magnitude from 
single-digit inflation to hyper-inflation (as in Zimbabwe 
in 2008). – Whether inflation is triggered by or indepen-
dent of injections of cash transfers, the consequence is 
the same – the purchasing power of cash transfers is 
reduced and the ability of the programme to smooth 
household food consumption through market purchases 
is compromised. All three sources of this problem have 
been observed on the PSNP.
The first possibility, that cash transfers could contribute 
to price inflation, is exemplified by the case of Meket 
woreda in North Wollo, Amhara Region. Between 2005 
and 2007, Save the Children UK implemented the Meket 
Livelihood Development Project (MLDP) alongside the 
PSNP. The MLDP paid public works participants Birr 5 per 
day, enough to buy 3kg of staple grain “on the assump-
tion that the average consumer price for grain would be 
Birr 1.7 per kg” (Kebede 2006: 584). In the first year of 
implementation grain prices rose significantly higher 
than usual in Meket, for reasons directly related to the 
PSNP and MLDP. Firstly, traders failed to respond promptly 
to demand signals following injections of cash into local 
communities. Secondly, instead of being regular and 
predictable, cash disbursements were late and arrived 
in unpredictable lump-sums, resulting in price spikes due 
to demand surges when food supplies were scarce. 
Thirdly, some traders allegedly exploited cash recipients 
by charging excessive profit margins. Fourthly, many 
farmers who received cash transfers withheld their grain 
from the market, since they no longer needed to sell 
produce to meet essential expenses (Kebede 2006).
Although this evidence strongly suggests that cash 
transfers had inflationary consequences in rural Ethiopian 
markets, this was the first year of the programme and 
these effects could be interpreted as transitional – traders 
needed time and confidence to react to the demand 
signals associated with cash transfers – and to problems 
with programme implementation – late and erratic deliv-
eries of cash. Nonetheless, “in the immediate term, the 
fact remains that the increase in prices has meant that 
cash recipients in Meket were unable to purchase the 
necessary food basket” (Kebede 2006: 597).
The second source of price variability is seasonality, 
which is significant in rural Ethiopia, where grain prices 
are among the most volatile in the world – and this vola-
tility has not reduced by much since grain markets were 
liberalised in the 1990s (Gabre-Madhin and Mezgebou 
2006). Prices also fluctuate in predictable cycles each 
year, being lowest after harvest and highest in the pre-
harvest hungry months. At the time of our first survey 
of PSNP beneficiaries in mid-2006, average prices of the 
four main staple cereals in highland Ethiopia – barley, 
maize, sorghum and wheat – were slightly lower than a 
year earlier, in mid-2005 (Table 2). Between mid- and late 
2005, these prices varied by 39%, with the greatest vari-
ability (65%) where average prices were lowest (SNNPR), 
and the least variability (29%) where prices were highest 
(Tigray).
The PSNP payment rate was set at 6 Birr per day in 
2005-06, on the assumption that this could purchase 3 
kilograms of staple cereal, at prices prevailing at the time. 
No allowance was made for price differentials between 
(and even within) regions, or for fluctuations that might 
occur in food prices during the year (specifically the likeli-
hood that food prices would rise during the months 
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preceding the next harvest). In fact, significant variations 
were observed in prices over space and time, which 
means that the conversion rate of PSNP cash transfers 
into food staples was highly variable from woreda to 
woreda and from month to month. Because of this price 
variability, the purchasing power of the cash transfer in 
terms of staple cereals varied by more than 100%, from 
as little as 2.5 kg (in Tigray in mid-2005) to as much as 
5.9 kg (in SNNPR in late 2005). On average over the year, 
6 Birr could purchase more than 3 kilograms of staple 
food in two regions (Oromiya and SNNPR), but less than 
3 kilograms in the other two regions (Amhara and Tigray) 
(see Figure 1). So PSNP beneficiaries in Oromiya and 
SNNPR received more cash than they needed to meet 
their subsistence food needs, while beneficiaries in 
Amhara and Tigray received less cash than they 
needed.
Figure 1. Value of PSNP cash transfer in staple food by 
region, 2005/06 (kg for 6 Birr)
Source: Devereux et al. 2006: 38
Interviews with traders confirmed that these effects 
were attributable to ‘normal’ food price seasonality, and 
were neither caused nor exacerbated by PSNP cash 
transfers.
“No change was created in the price of food due to PSNP; 
rather, it is the seasons that create price changes” (grocery 
trader, SNNPR).
The third contributor to food price rises, general infla-
tionary trends, was exacerbated by the global surge in 
food and other commodity prices in 2007/08, which did 
not overlook Ethiopia. After an extended period of steady 
but moderate rates of inflation – it took nine years, from 
1998 to 2006, for food prices to double – the average 
price of a standard food basket redoubled in just 18 
months to mid-2008 (Figure 2).
It is often assumed that subsistence-oriented farming 
households in highland Ethiopia are largely insulated 
against volatile food prices in global markets, and it is 
true, for instance, that local grain prices mainly reflect 
local production in the latest harvest. (This explains why 
prices reported in Table 2 are lower in mid-2006 than in 
mid-2005, despite evidence from Figure 2 that the 
national CPI – which partly reflects price trends of 
imported commodities consumed in large urban centres 
– was climbing over this period.) However, poor rural 
families in Ethiopia are chronically unable to meet their 
subsistence food needs through own production, and 
are net purchasers of food. This makes them acutely 
vulnerable to rising prices of either domestically produced 
or imported food commodities. As discussed below, the 
failure of the belg rains in 2008 caused domestic food 
prices to rise sharply, which interacted with imported 
food price inflation to produce the surge in the CPI as 
illustrated in Figure 2.
The unprecedented acceleration of food prices in 
Ethiopia since mid-2007 is significant for the PSNP 
because rising food prices erode the purchasing power 
of un-indexed cash transfers, and the primary intention 
of PSNP cash transfers is to provide market access to 
food. Figure 2 reveals how the value of PSNP cash trans-
fers collapsed to less than half of their initial purchasing 
power within four years of the programme’s inception. 
By mid-2008 the average price of staple grains in Ethiopia 
was almost three times higher than it was when the PSNP 
started in January 2005, but the PSNP cash transfer level 
had increased by only 33%. In response to rising food 
prices and the declining value of cash transfers, the 
payment was raised from Birr 6 to Birr 8 per day at the 
start of the 2008 implementation cycle.
Data
The data presented here come from a longitudinal (panel) 
quantitative survey data collected at the household and 
locality levels in 2006 and 2008. These data were collected 
in the four major regions covered by the PSNP; Tigray, 
Amhara, Oromiya and SNNPR. The sampling method-
ology was established during the 2006 survey. A full 
description of the sample size calculations and sampling 
frame can be found in (Devereux et al, 2006).  Woredas 
were not part of the sampling frame, as they were pre-
selected in 2006 in order to reflect a range of implemen-
tation modalities. A three-stage stratified random 
sampling procedure was followed in each woreda – at 
the kebele, village and household level. A total of 960 
households were sampled, disaggregated as 120 house-
holds per woreda, and 60 households per kebele (at two 
kebeles per woreda), and 60 households per village (at 
one village per kebele). Note that this sample is not 
Table 2. Average price for four food staples by region, 2005/06 (Birr/kg)
Region Mid-2005 Late 2005 Mid-2006 Average Variation
Amhara 2.26 1.74 2.25 2.08 30%
Oromiya 1.91 1.31 1.64 1.62 46%
SNNPR 1.68 1.02 1.39 1.36 65%
Tigray 2.39 1.85 2.29 2.18 29%
Staples 2.06 1.48 1.89 1.81 39%
Source: Devereux et al. 2006: 37
Note: This analysis averages prices for barley, maize, sorghum and wheat.
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representative of all Ethiopia, nor of all communities 
where the PSNP is implemented.
Since one objective of this study is to compare trends 
in households receiving food transfers with trends in 
those receiving cash transfers, the decision was taken to 
survey approximately equal numbers of cash and food 
beneficiaries overall. Also, on the assumption that 
approximately 80% of PSNP beneficiaries are employed 
on public works projects while no more than 20% are 
receiving direct support, these proportions were also 
reflected in the total sample. Finally, non-beneficiaries 
were randomly selected (20% of the total) from the pool 
of households that were not participating in the PSNP 
within each village visited.
Three methods of quantitative data collection were 
designed, pre-tested, and administered in the field: a 
household survey, a community questionnaire, and a 
market observation survey. These instruments were 
designed to capture the impact and outcome indicators 
associated with the PSNP. The household questionnaire 
contained sections on: household demographics; income 
from livelihood activities; asset listings and values; 
savings and investments; extent and nature of programme 
participation; use of transfers, and other programme 
related information.
The household questionnaire in 2008 was only slightly 
modified from the 2006 questionnaire, to maximise 
comparability and allow inferences to be drawn about 
changes over time and the impacts of the PSNP on a 
range of outcome indicators between 2006 and 2008. 
Attrition was relatively small. In 2008, 93% of the 2006 
households were traced and re-interviewed, forming a 
panel of 893 households. Households that could not be 
traced were replaced by random selection on the basis 
of PSNP status from household rosters obtained from 
kebele administrations. Also, several PSNP participants 
had left the programme since 2006 and formed a new 
category of ‘past beneficiaries’. See table 3 for basic 
descriptive of the sample in both years.
Programme insights
This section presents findings from the two rounds of 
the PSNP panel survey, on PSNP cash and food transfers 
– actual receipts, and beneficiary preferences – and on 
the falling value of cash transfers between 2006 and 
2008.
Types of transfers – receipt and 
preferences
In our 2006 survey, 81% of PSNP participants received 
payment in the form of cash, either in full or in combina-
tion with food. Only 19% of households received ‘food 
only’ (Table 4). In the 2008 survey, the proportion 
receiving ‘cash plus food’ fell from 66% to 53%, while the 
proportion receiving ‘cash only’ rose from 15% to 21%. 
Over the same period, ‘food only’ recipients did not 
decline as planned, but increased from 19% to 26%.
In contrast to these relatively minor shifts in type of 
transfers actually received, there was a substantial shift 
in preferences of PSNP participants over this two-year 
period. In 2006, almost half of all beneficiaries surveyed 
(45%) expressed a preference for receiving all or part of 
their transfers from the PSNP in cash – either as a combi-
nation of ‘half cash and half food’ (36%) or as ‘cash only’ 
(9%). By 2008, this preference for cash had shrunk to just 
one in six (16%), while the proportion of beneficiaries 
choosing ‘food only’ had risen from just over half (55%) 
to more than four in five (84%). These findings were rein-
forced and contextualised by qualitative fieldwork. 
Participants in community discussions explained their 
belief that cash transfers were fuelling food price 
inflation.1
The Safety Net programme has influenced the 
market for some time. When beneficiaries were paid 
in cash, prices increased and supplies also became 
scarce. They faced great problems in the market 
during this time. The local traders increased prices 
on rural people. (Oromia)
Conversely, food transfers were credited with stabi-
lising food prices and supplies.
Since the payment is done in grain, it has not 
affected the supply and price of food. As a result it 
has helped the stability of food price and increased 
the supply of food crops. It has enabled food crops 
to be available in the market and made the price 
stable. (Amhara)
Figure 2. Price inflation in Ethiopia, 1998–2008
Source: Central Statistical Agency, Ethiopia
Table 3. Sample stratification by PSNP 
benficiary status
Household characteristic 2006 2008
PSNP transfers *
Cash only 120 144
Food only 144 184
Cash + food 498 368
PSNP category *
Public Works 607 549
Direct Support 155 152
PSNP status
Current beneficiaries 762 701
Past beneficiaries (2006) 102
Non-beneficiaries 198 157
All households 960 960
Source: Authors’ calculations; PSNP ‘Trends in Transfers’ 
dataset, 2006/2008
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For these reasons, many cash recipients articulated a 
preference for food, and often requested that PSNP 
payments be switched to food.
The beneficiaries preferred the payment to be in 
food and they did not want the cash payment. Since 
the price of food was increasing they could not buy 
enough food with the cash given to them. The main 
problem was lack of food and its high price. 
(SNNPR)
The type of payment was in cash and this was 
decided by the government. The community 
repeatedly requested the local government officials 
that the payment should be changed into food but 
there was no feedback at all. (Tigray)
These findings are disappointing from the perspective 
of one objective of the PSNP – to shift the delivery of 
social assistance in rural Ethiopia away from food aid 
towards cash transfers – but can be interpreted as an 
entirely rational response to the combined effects of high 
food price inflation, deteriorating household food secu-
rity, and the weakness of rural commodity markets.
The falling value of PSNP cash transfers in 
the context of food price inflation
Average values of transfers to PSNP households were 
substantially higher in 2008 than in 2006. Most of this 
increase was driven by the substantially increased value 
of food transfers, due to higher staple food prices – which 
averaged 4.1 Birr/kg, as opposed to 1.7 Birr/kg in 2006. 
The market value of food transfers was more than three 
times the value of cash transfers in 2008 – cash transfers 
to male-headed households averaged 482 Birr, whereas 
food transfers were worth 1,326 Birr. If 2006 food prices 
were used to value food transfers in 2008, the difference 
would be less dramatic – food transfers would be worth 
697 Birr, just 1.4 times higher than cash transfers.
This very likely explains the shift in beneficiary prefer-
ences towards food transfers, as reported above. It also 
demonstrates that the level of cash transfers is increas-
ingly inadequate, having fallen sharply in terms of food 
purchasing power. This finding is critical for PSNP plan-
ners, because it compromises the programme’s primary 
objective of securing household access to adequate food, 
as well as the secondary objective of breaking Ethiopia’s 
chronic dependency on food aid.
The changing relative value of food and cash transfers 
also affects the calculation of what proportion of their 
‘entitlements’ under the PSNP participants actually 
received. Programme documents state that each indi-
vidual is entitled to a maximum of 30 days of transfers 
each year, which amounted to 240 Birr per capita at 8 
Birr in 2008. (It was 180 Birr in 2006, when the daily 
transfer was set at 6 Birr.) ‘Cash only’ recipients received 
two-thirds of their entitlement in 2008 (166 Birr = 69% 
of 240 Birr). Conversely, recipients of ‘cash plus food’ pack-
ages received one-third more than they were entitled 
to (317 Birr = 132%), while ‘food only’ recipients received 
almost twice their entitlement, in cash equivalent terms 
(456 Birr = 190%) (Table 5). These calculations show 
vividly the effects of food price inflation on the transfer 
value – and the failure of the programme to increase 
cash transfers sufficiently to match inflation.
Analysis
Our primary purpose in the quantitative evaluation is to 
determine whether the PSNP has had significant effects 
on beneficiaries across a range of indicators. With regard 
to income and assets we want to know whether partici-
pation in the programme is associated with higher 
income and asset growth. As for the food gap, we want 
to establish whether participation in the programme 
decreases the average number of months in which a 
food shortage is experienced compared to non-benefi-
ciaries. Our primary test is therefore to estimate the effect 
of programme participation on the difference in income/
assets between the two periods – is the income/asset 
growth of participants over time significantly higher than 
that of non-participants?
Variable description
We use a number of variables to inform our analysis 
below. For presentational purposes we focus primarily 
on outcome indicators – income, assets and food security 
– and the programme transfer type explanatory variables. 
Variable description and descriptive statistics for the 
variables are presented in Table 6.
Outcome Variables
Income
An aggregate income variable was created using self-
reported farm and non-farm income from all household 
members over a one-year period, for both 2006 and 2008. 
Income is measured in Birr. The survey collected average 
monthly income information from 42 livelihood activities, 
ranging from agricultural activities to paid employment, 
services and trading. The aggregate income measure 
does not include the value of direct transfers (such as 
Direct Support); however, it does include payments made 
to participants on public works. This is because 
respondents could participate in a number 
of public works programmes. Using informa-
tion from a separate section in the question-
naire on PSNP involvement we are confident 
that the majority of the public works reported 
is PSNP-related works. 2For this reason we 
are able to use income (including public 
works) as one dependent variable, and 
income excluding public works payment as 
another. Inclusion of public works payments 
within the income aggregate enables us to 
determine the extent to which an income 
Table 4. Transfers received and preferences of PSNP 
households, 2006 and 2008
Transfers Received Stated Preference
2006 2008 2006 2008
Cash only 15% 21% 9% 3%
Food only 19% 26% 55% 84%
Mixed (cash + food) 66% 53% 36% 13%
Total households 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Authors’ calculations; PSNP ‘Trends in Transfers’ dataset, 
2006/2008
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transfer acts as a safety net relative to non-beneficiaries. 
Exclusion of the public work payments from income 
provides an indication of the additional impacts of the 
PSNP transfer, over and above the transfer itself. For 
instance, if we find a significant parameter estimate on 
beneficiary status in this latter model it suggests that 
there are spill-over benefits to the PSNP, such as increased 
investment due to more stable income.
Income in 2008 was deflated using the average infla-
tion rate (for food and non-food items) that corresponds 
to the time between our interview recall periods (between 
March 2005 and June 2008). Specifically, we took the 
increase in CPI between March 2005 and March 2007, 
between April 2005 and April 2007… and so on. We then 
took an average of the increase in the CPI over the 40 
month period. The average monthly inflation rate (using 
the CPI series) between 2005 and 2008 was 40.9%. This 
is relatively low given the substantial food price inflation 
(as opposed to food and non-food) during this period. 
The variation of the CPI during this 40-month period 
ranged from a minimum of 80.2 % in March 2005 to 166.7 
% in June 2008. As the size of any programme effect will 
be sensitive to the inflation rate, we estimated our main 
regressions using 40.9% and a rate of 80%. We only report 
results using the former rate, as the implications of our 
results do not change with a higher inflation rate.
A small percentage of households reported missing 
values on incomes or assets (52 households for income 
(6.5%) and 68 households for assets (8.6%)). Looking at 
the data and speaking with fieldworkers it is clear that 
many of these respondents had chosen not to disclose 
their income and assets. In order not to bias our income 
and asset information we used multiple imputation, 
based on a range of household characteristics, to impute 
values for these households. To test for 
the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the 
models allowing the missing values to remain missing 
and also using imputations based on wealth distribution. 
The results still hold. To minimise the problems associated 
with a non-random error term we include a dummy vari-
able in all our regressions that indicates whether multiple 
imputation was performed for each respondent.3
Our dependent variable used for regression analysis 
is constructed by taking the difference in the log of 
income in 2008 and 2006. Table  reports mean annual 
income from both years across all payment types. In 2006 
we see that non-beneficiaries had a higher mean income 
(2,176 Birr) than any category of programme beneficia-
ries. By 2008 the same group had the lowest mean income 
across all groups, at 1,587 Birr, representing a decline in 
real income over the period. All categories of recipients 
experienced substantial increases in their annual income 
over the two-year period. In particular, cash payment 
households experienced more that a doubling of their 
real income (from 1,483 Birr to 3,282 Birr per annum), 
whereas the food and mixed payment households 
witnessed a more modest, yet significant increase.
Assets
Total asset value variables were constructed from a 
detailed asset inventory containing numbers and values 
of livestock, other productive assets and non-productive 
assets, in 2006 and 2008. Assets are valued in Birr. Where 
reported, replacement values were used to value the 
current value of assets. Where no replacement value was 
reported, prices were imputed using the mean asset 
values from the sample data. An adjusted asset value for 
2008 was calculated with the same method but using 
2006 prices to value 2008 assets. This enabled us to 
observe changes in real asset values. As with income our 
dependent variable is constructed by taking the differ-
ence in the log of assets in 2008 and 2006. In Table 6 we 
provide statistics on two aggregate 2008 asset variables. 
The first includes all asset values. The second excludes 
18 extreme values (over 15000 Birr). For the regression 
analysis we topcode these extreme values at 15000 
Birr.
We also constructed a livestock asset value variable. 
We did this as livestock is a better measure of purely 
productive assets than all assets and because many 
households are reliant on livestock for their livelihoods. 
We wish to see whether there is a programme effect on 
livestock asset growth. 
Table 6 shows that, compared to 2006, all groups had 
higher mean asset holdings in 2008 (excluding the 
extreme values). Non-beneficiaries owned significantly 
more assets in total and livestock (as a subset) in 2006 
than other groups. Cash payment households also held 
more assets in 2006, but not substantially more. By 2008 
cash payment households had tripled their aggregate 
assets, whereas food and mixed payment households 
only saw a doubling of theirs. When we look at livestock 
Table 5. Total value of cash and food transfers to PSNP households, per capita, 2008
Category Total  cereal  per 
household (kg)
Cash value of cereal 
(Birr)
Total cash received 
(Birr)
Total value of food and 
cash received
Household type
Male-headed 64.7 265.4 82.6 348.0
Female-headed 54.9 225.3 82.8 308.1
PSNP status
Cash only n/a n/a 166.1 166.1
Food only 111.2 455.9 n/a 455.9
Cash + food 55.8 228.7 91.1 316.8
Source: Authors’ calculations; PSNP ‘Trends in Transfers’ dataset, 2006/2008
Note: Calculations of cash value of food are based on an average cereal price of 4.1 Birr/kg.
Across whole sample of current beneficiaries.
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only, we see that in fact it is food payment households 
that experienced the largest increase in livestock; cash 
payment households actually experienced a real decline. 
This probably reflects two successive good years enjoyed 
by the Ethiopian economy, specifically by the agriculture 
sector. As with income, non-beneficiaries had higher 
asset holdings in 2006, suggesting that the PSNP was 
well targeted on poorer households. Unlike income, 
assets for non-beneficiaries remained substantially 
higher than for any beneficiary group in 2008.
Food Gap
The other outcome variable of interest is an indicator of 
food security. As our survey did not collect consumption 
indicators we use number of months of self-reported 
food shortage each year, as a proxy for changing nutri-
tional (in)security of the household. We construct a 
dependent food gap variable by taking the difference 
in months of food shortage reported in 2008 from the 
months of food shortage reported in 2006.
Table 6 indicates that across all categories, households 
experienced an improvement in their food security situ-
ation across the two-year period, as indicated by a fall 
in mean months of food shortage. Non-beneficiaries and 
‘cash only’ recipients are significantly more likely to have 
never experienced a food shortage (32% and 21% respec-
tively) as compared to mainly food and mixed 
beneficiaries (7% and 2% respectively). This may indicate 
that the ‘cash only’ households may constitute a group 
with characteristics more similar to non-beneficiaries 
than to other beneficiaries. The extent to which PSNP 
transfers will affect each group will depend, upon other 
things, on the characteristics of the households.
Explanatory Variables
Programme Beneficiary – transfer type
The survey sample in 2006 comprised 960 households: 
198 non-beneficiaries and 762 PSNP beneficiaries. In 2008 
we again interviewed 960 households, 893 of whom 
(93%) were previous respondents: 144 non-beneficiaries, 
651 beneficiaries and 98 past beneficiaries. The last 
category refers to those households who left the 
programme for various reasons between 2006 and 2008. 
These households are not included in our analysis here. 
Thus our sample size comprises 795 households, of which 
18% are non-beneficiaries and 82% are beneficiaries.
It is possible to construct a range of variables for 
programme status. As the primary focus of this paper is 
the nature of the transfer we categorise beneficiaries 
according to the type of payment actually received. We 
are interested to observe whether there are significant 
differences between respondents receiving different 
types of payment. In order to create clear categories 
across time we construct a 4-category variable, illustrated 
Table 6. Data description: Outcome indicators
Description Non Food Mixed Cash
Obs Number of observations 117/ 16% 212/30% 260/36% 126/18%
Outcome indicators
Income_06 Mean (sd) annual income in 
2005/2006
2176.4
(2055.6)
1511.6
(1275.1)
1351.2
(1481.3)
1483.1
(1048.3)
Income_08 Mean (sd) annual income 2007/2008, 
deflated 
1587.1
(1913.2)
2067.6
(1494.0)
1821.2
(1571.1)
3282.2
(2806.5)
Assets_06 Total value of productive and non-
productive assets in 2006
1443.0
(1489.2)
819.5
(1010.7)
741.5
(678.3)
986.4
(1185.1)
Assets_08 Mean (sd) value of productive and 
non-productive assets in 2008, 
priced at 2006 prices
4339.2
(8115.8)
1545.9
(1497.1)
1572.9
(3986.9)
3136.2
(986.4)
Assets_08_E
(extreme)
Mean (sd) value assets in 2008, priced 
at 2006 prices removing values > 
15000 (n=697)
2472
(2768.6)
1545.9
(1497.1)
1249.2
(1742.8)
2801.9
(2603.3)
Livestock_06 Mean (sd) value of livestock in 
2008
1386.1
(1406.8)
842.51
(968.5)
743.9
(624.9)
978.6
(1120.7)
Livestock_08 Mean (sd) value of livestock in 2008, 
priced at 2006 prices
1104.9
(890.4)
1196.9
(997.9)
986.0
(781.3)
913.1
(691.9)
Months food 
shortage06
Mean months of food shortage given 
food shortage reported 2006
3.35 5 6.02 3.8
Months food 
shortage 08
Mean months of food shortage given 
food shortage reported 2008
1.82 1.98 2.85 1.56
Never shortage % of households never experiencing 
food shortage
32 6.6 1.7 21
Always 
shortage
% of households always experi-
encing food shortage between 2006 
and 2008 
41 54 64 28
 Source: Authors’ calculations; PSNP ‘Trends in Transfers’ dataset, 2006/2008; ‘sd’ denotes standard deviation.
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in Table 7. Non-beneficiaries refer to households who 
have always been non-beneficiaries – over the two-year 
period they never participated in the PSNP. ‘Mainly food’ 
households are those that have always received at least 
70% of their PSNP payments in food. ‘Cash’ households 
are those that have always received at least 70% of their 
payments in cash. ‘Mixed payment’ households are those 
that received a mixture of cash and food over the period 
but not more than 70% food or 70% cash. Fifty-five house-
holds from the panel reported that they were non-ben-
eficiaries in 2006 but beneficiaries in 2008. These 
households are excluded from this analysis. A further 25 
households provided confusing signals about their 
beneficiary status and they have also been dropped. The 
total sample used for our analysis here is 715.
Other control variables:  
Control variables are introduced in the model to deal 
with observable factors that may affect programme 
participation and future outcomes. Among these factors 
we include the age of the household head, whether the 
household head can read, the highest level of qualifica-
tions achieved by the head of the household, labour 
capacity of the household and household size. In addi-
tion, for all estimations we use controls for land use in 
2006, asset value in 2006, income in 2006, and regional 
differences.
The descriptive data show that non-beneficiaries and 
cash payment households have, on average, younger 
heads; higher levels of literacy; higher land use in both 
2006 and 2008; higher savings and higher expenditures. 
Compared to other groups, food payment households 
show higher numbers of heads with no education (83%) 
and lower levels of literacy, substantially higher numbers 
of female-headed households (40%), fewer household 
members and lower levels of land use. Mixed payment 
households display a similar pattern to food payment 
households across most demographic indicators. This is 
interesting because the initial decision on whether to 
deliver cash or food transfers through the PSNP was 
based on an assessment of local capacities – of both 
woreda administrations and local markets – to manage 
sizeable injections of cash. We might therefore expect 
food recipients to be clustered in isolated areas with weak 
markets, far from urban centres, with low levels of 
economic activity and higher than average poverty rates. 
Conversely, cash recipients would more likely be located 
near towns and be better integrated into thriving markets, 
with lower poverty rates at both household and woreda 
levels. The descriptive indicators provide some confirma-
tion for this speculation.
Across regions, the highest proportion of cash payment 
households is located in Tigray, with food transfers domi-
nating in Amhara and Oromiya, while most beneficiaries 
in SNNPR received mixed payments of cash plus food. 
We are interested in estimating the differentiated 
programme effects of different payment modalities. It 
is possible that the impact could be a ‘region effect’ given 
that ‘cash only’ payments are not provided in all regions. 
We control for region by including regional dummies in 
the regression analysis. These are significant in most 
cases, however their inclusion does not detract from the 
main conclusions around programme modalities.
One reason for the prevalence of cash transfers in 
Tigray could be high levels of public and private invest-
ment in the region in recent years, which has stimulated 
economic growth that ‘trickles down’ to villagers through 
remittances, improved off-farm employment opportuni-
ties, and more demand for locally produced goods and 
services. One of the two Tigray woredas in our survey – 
Enderta – is located near to Mekele, the regional capital, 
so local incomes have probably been boosted through 
these mechanisms. These factors would also have influ-
enced the decision to deliver cash rather than food trans-
fers in Tigray.
Econometric results
Methodology
We use the following empirical model to test for the effect 
of programme participation and payment modality.4
  
€ 
LN Inc08( ) − LN (Inc06) = β0 + β1BS + β2C + ε  (1)
where LN stands for the natural logarithm, Inc08 and 
Inc06 stands for real income in 2008 and income in 2006, 
BS is a dummy variable for beneficiary status; C stands 
for controls, which includes regional controls, and ε is 
the error term. βs are vectors of parameters to be esti-
mated by ordinary least squares regression (OLS). The 
differences in logs can be interpreted as percentage 
differences in the underlying levels.
We chose to use traditional OLS multivariate regres-
sion analysis for the following three reasons. First, our 
outcome is a continuous variable, normally distributed. 
Second, we have a small sample. An alternative route 
would use matching methods for evaluation of the 
average programme effect as this would enable us to 
compare ‘similarly endowed’ beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries and would substantially overcome possible 
problems related to unobservable factors that influence 
our outcomes. Our sample of non-beneficiaries is too 
small to allow for matching.5 Third and partly related to 
the second point, participation in the PSNP was targeted 
mainly on poor people. For this reason, we believe that 
the problems of self-selection regarding the impact of 
programme participation on outcomes are minimal. As 
we have shown above in the descriptive variables, 
programme participants had lower income and assets, 
on average, and came from relatively poorer families, 
than non-participants. Hence, our model assumes that 
if the programme is to have an effect, this would have 
to be such that it enabled beneficiaries to overcome their 
initial situation which was worse than for non-beneficia-
ries. We believe that the OLS estimate of this impact is a 
sufficient methodology.
Table 8 shows results from the estimated parameters 
of the above model for income I (including public works 
payments), income II (excluding public works payments), 
aggregate assets, livestock and the food gap. We find a 
positive and significant growth of income for food 
payment and mixed payment beneficiaries compared 
with non-beneficiaries (both at the 1% level). We do not 
find a significant effect for the cash payment group 
compared to non-beneficiaries. In other words, income 
growth is higher with participation in the programme 
for food recipients and mixed payment recipients, relative 
to non-participants.
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Since our dependent variables (income and assets) 
are expressed as the difference in logs we can interpret 
the parameter as a percentage differences in the rate of 
change of income growth. So, holding all other factors 
constant, being a food payment beneficiary increased 
income growth by 59% relative to a non-beneficiary. 
Mixed payment households also witnessed a positive 
and significant income growth relative to non-benefi-
ciaries, to the order of 45%. There is no significant differ-
ence for cash payment beneficiaries. The difference 
between the estimated parameters for food payment 
(0.59) and cash payment (0.15) in Table 8 is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.
This represents a very substantial programme impact. 
The reasons for this are multiple. The obvious reason is 
that the PSNP transfer from the public works is included 
in the income variable. Thus, the PSNP is providing a 
direct income effect. In other words it has buffered 
possible negative growth rates for beneficiaries. Another 
reason may be that transfers, especially those in the form 
of food, enable beneficiaries to sell the food that they 
produce and would otherwise have consumed. 
Furthermore, some beneficiaries are able to sell some of 
the food they received. The food also enables them to 
spend more time trading and doing other productive 
activities, given that they do not have to worry about 
securing food. In order to test whether this second expla-
nation is a possibility we estimate model 2 using income 
II that excludes public works payments. We find a signifi-
cant effect (at the 10% level) for food payment house-
holds only, suggesting that for these households the 
transfer has enabled and encouraged income growth 
above and beyond a direct safety net. In this model the 
size of the programme effect is much smaller (34% higher 
growth for food payment beneficiaries compared to 
non-beneficiaries).
Thus we see that the PSNP has acted as a safety net 
for beneficiaries, in the sense that the decline in their 
income has not been as severe as for non-beneficiaries. 
In fact beneficiaries have experienced some income 
Table 7. Data description: Explanatory variables
Description Non Food Mixed Cash
Obs Number of observations 117/16% 212/30% 260/36% 126/18%
Explanatory variables
Region
Amhara % of households 17.87 38.16 24.64 19.32
SNNPR % of households 21.82 7.88 69.09 1.21
Oromiya % of households 19.14 49.38 31.48 0
Tigray % of households 7.18 22.1 24.31 46.41
Household resources, 2006 
Livelihood 
Package
% of households obtaining a 
PSNP-related l ivelihood 
package
26 32 30 22
Labour cap An index measuring labour 
capacity in 2006
3.14 2.07 2.69 2.3
P u b l i c  W o r k s 
participant
% of households engaged in 
public works in 2006
- 81 77 79
Household 
Size_06
N u m b e r  o f  m e m b e r s 
comprising the household in 
2006
6.01 4.65 5.7 4.7
Headship characteristics
Age Age of household head in 
2006
44 47 49 45
Education % of household heads with no 
education in 2006
72 83 79 79
Female headed % of female headed house-
holds in 2006
13 40 26 32
Literate % of household heads indi-
cating they are able to read
37 20 26 28
Land Use 06 Hectares used in 06 1.03
(0.40)
0.41
(0.40)
0.44
(0.43)
0.55
(0.57)
Land Use 08 Hectares used in 08 1.2
(1.53)
0.59
(0.48)
0.63
(0.76)
0.84
(083)
Source: Authors’ calculations; PSNP ‘Trends in Transfers’ dataset, 2006/2008
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growth. We also see some evidence of other transfer 
effects. There are a number of reasons why non-benefi-
ciaries faced a reduction in real income. The first is that 
due to high food prices they needed to consume more 
food rather than sell it. Second, it is possible that non-
beneficiaries, being fully aware of the PSNP and the 
possibility of their being included if they meet the eligi-
bility criteria, systematically under-reported their income. 
We do not find this argument compelling, given that the 
asset data is not similarly underestimated.
Models 3 and 4 provide results for the assets and live-
stock estimations. Table 8 also shows the estimation 
results for the food gap. For assets in aggregate we see 
that, while earlier descriptive statistics showed large 
increases in assets for everyone, mixed payment house-
holds experienced significantly less asset growth than 
non-beneficiaries (model 3). Model 4 indicates that food 
payment households have experienced 62% higher 
growth in livestock than non-beneficiaries, and this is 
significantly different at the 1% level. Furthermore, food 
payment households have significantly higher livestock 
growth than other payment types. This result sits well 
with model 2 results as it suggests some investment spill-
over effects of the PSNP transfer (again, over and above 
the safety net function).
The signs on land_06 assets_06 and income_06 across 
the first 4 models appear counter-intuitive. If we look 
back at the descriptive statistics we see that those respon-
dents with more land and income in 2006 were predomi-
nantly non-beneficiaries. It is these households that 
experienced negative real income growth over the two-
year period, thus explaining the negative relationship 
between higher initial income and lower income growth. 
This is largely due to the model specification and the 
fact that we chose not to include initial income as an 
explanatory variable. With the exception of a significant 
and negative impact of an illness shocks on income II 
growth, we see that shocks are not significant in 
explaining outcomes across the models and between 
participant modalities.
Food and mixed payment households had fewer 
months of food shortage than non-beneficiaries and cash 
households. Food and mixed payment households expe-
rienced an average reduction in food shortage of 1.2 
months a year, an improvement in household food secu-
rity which is significantly better than the experiences of 
non-beneficiaries and cash payment recipients.
There are intriguing differences across the four regions. 
While in the income model all other regions had higher 
income growth than Amhara, in the food gap model, all 
other households had significantly higher months of food 
shortage than Amhara. It is important to emphasise that 
our sample was drawn from just two woredas within 
each region, so the findings reported here cannot claim 
to be representative at the regional level. Nonetheless, 
this apparent paradox needs to be explained. The main 
factor is probably the failure of belg rains in 2008, which 
affected Amhara most severely. Food and cash crop 
production were substantially reduced, and livestock 
deaths were reported by many respondents in our 
Amhara woredas (but nowhere else). This explains the 
fall in real incomes in our Amhara sample – evidently, 
the PSNP is not robust enough to protect livelihoods 
against severe shocks.
However, respondents in Amhara region also regis-
tered higher levels of food security in 2008 (fewer self-
reported months of hunger), which seems implausible 
given that their incomes were falling. The explanation is 
that these woredas received emergency food aid in 2008, 
following the belg rains failure. Moreover, PSNP house-
holds in Amhara region that received their payments in 
cash were given two extra months of transfers. Programme 
officials argued that these households were doubly 
affected by drought as well as the surge in food prices. 
Conversely, households that received their PSNP 
payments in food were not given additional support, 
because food transfers are not undermined by price infla-
tion. This resolves the apparent paradox, of negative 
income growth in our Amhara sample (caused by drought 
and high food prices) but improved household food 
security (because of the emergency intervention and 
the extension of PSNP support).
Discussion 
Very few social protection programmes deliver both cash 
and food transfers to their beneficiaries, and in this sense 
the Productive Safety Net Programme offers a rare oppor-
tunity for comparative analysis. In a context of high food 
price inflation and a fixed cash payment, cash recipients 
would be expected to derive smaller welfare gains rela-
tive to food recipients. Our panel survey confirms this 
hypothesis. We find positive programme effects on 
income growth and food security, especially for food only 
and mixed (cash plus food) payment households. PSNP 
food recipients have enjoyed accelerated income growth 
relative to cash recipients, whose income gains have been 
compromised by inflation. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
beneficiary attitudes are hardening against cash and in 
favour of food transfers.
In one sense these outcomes are positive: since our 
data reveal that cash payment recipients were initially 
better off across a range of indicators (and remain better 
off), it could be argued that the PSNP has had a pro-poor 
growth acceleration effect. This result is specific to our 
sample, and may not hold for other PSNP communities, 
or to social protection schemes in other countries.
On the other hand, these findings support the view 
that a reliance on un-indexed cash transfers to deliver 
social protection in an inflationary environment is not 
an optimal strategy, because commodity-based transfers 
retain their value whereas the purchasing power of cash 
transfers is eroded by rising commodity prices. An appro-
priate response to inflation is to reconsider the balance 
between cash and food transfers, or alternatively to intro-
duce index-linking to cash payments, to ensure that they 
retain their real value irrespective of food price 
movements.
A related approach is explored by FEG Consulting 
(2008), which assessed the differential levels of assistance 
that PSNP beneficiaries would need under alternative 
scenarios, one of which was high food prices. Instead of 
raising the level of daily transfer payments, FEG calibrated 
different durations of PSNP support by household wealth 
status, assuming good or poor harvest outcomes and 
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Table 8. Estimation results – income, assets and food gap
1 2 3 4 5
INCOME I
(Ln08-Ln06)
INCOME II
(Ln08-Ln06)
ASSETS
(Ln08-Ln06)
LIVESTOCK
(Ln08-Ln06)
FOOD GAP
(mn08-mn06)
coef/(s.e.) coef/(s.e.) coef/(s.e.) coef/(s.e.) coef/(s.e.)
Food 0.597***
(0.152)
0.340*
(0.2)
-0.282
(0.211)
0.629***
(0.237)
-1.246***
(0.450)
Mixed 0.453***
(0.163)
0.084
(0.221)
-0.437***
(0.195)
0.152
(0.218)
-1.242***
(0.422)
Cash 0.150
(0.208)
0.210
(0.273)
-0.363
(0.264)
-0.057
(0.309)
-0.419
(0.453)
SNNPR 0.701***
(0.162)
1.23***
(0.215)
-0.761***
(0.233)
0.129
(0.299)
1.922***
(0.478)
Oromiya 0.504***
(0.154)
0.605***
(0.192)
-0.960***
(0.204)
-0.121
(0.253)
2.809***
(0.432)
Tigray 1.802***
(0.164)
2.07***
(0.215)
0.134
(0.204)
0.299
(0.248)
2.375***
(0.324)
HoH age_06 0.002
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.191***
(0.005)
-0.015***
(0.006)
0.010
(0.009)
HoH literacy_06 -0.011
(0.119)
0.009
(0.186)
0.03
(0.177)
0.302
(0.241)
0.025
(0.371)
HoH education_06 -0.036
(0.029)
-0.57
(0.041)
-0.046
(0.044)
0.032
(0.051)
0.079
(0.092)
Labour Cap_06 0.004
(0.036)
0.023
(0.052)
-0.094
(0.044)
-0.027
(0.065)
-0.024
(0.118)
Household size_06 -0.040*
(0.023)
-0.108***
(0.033)
0.062*
(0.035)
-0.014
(0.043)
-0.131*
(0.077)
HoH gender_06 -0.040
(0.124)
-0.162
(0.160)
-0.077
(0.187)
-0.044
(0.202)
-0.715***
(0.306)
Land Use_06 -0.211***
(0.093)
-0.272**
(0.119)
-0.123
(0.134)
-0.202*
(0.119)
0.617***
(0.217)
Ln Income 06 -0.122*
(0.075)
-0.286***
(0.110)
0.219
(0.142)
Ln Assets 08 -0.061
(0.037)
0.008
(0.045)
-0.009
(0.101)
Drought Shock 0.017
(0.115)
0.041
(0.159)
-0.401
(0.171)
0.127
(0.185)
0.415
(0.306)
Illness shock -0.009
(0.105)
-0.262*
(0.138)
-0.103
(0.152)
0.120
(0.169)
0.111
(0.289)
Flood shock 0.221
(0.118)
-0.120
(0.178)
0.151
(0.174)
-0.108
(0.196)
0.115
(0.336)
Credit 0.095
(0.082)
0.131
(0.115)
-0.194
(0.128)
-0.300***
(0.154)
-0.105
(0.250)
imputation dummy -0.171
(0.465)
-0.304
(0.333)
0.122
(0.537)
0.199
(0.204)
Constant -0.353
(0.349)
-0.316
(0.400)
3.24***
(0.655)
2.865***
(0.931)
-5.582***
(1.240)
Obs 708 708 708 708 708
r squared 0.2890 0.2303 0.1103 0.1021 0.1838
Source: Authors’ calculations; PSNP ‘Trends in Transfers’ dataset, 2006/2008
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 9. Number of beneficiaries requiring different durations of PSNP assistance in ‘average’ and ‘high 
inflation’ years, Boricha woreda, SNNPR
D u rat i o n  o f 
deficit 
(months)
M o n t h s  o f 
assistance 
required
Average year (2006) Inflation year (2008)
Total 
beneficiaries
% of  Woreda 
population
Total beneficiaries % of  Woreda 
population
<1.5 <3 14,002 5% 26,545 10%
1.5–4.5 3 9,726 4% 55,963 22%
4.5–7.5 6 0 0% 13,587 5%
7.5–10.5 9 0 0% 0 0%
Total 23,728 9% 96,095 38%
Source: Compiled from FEG Consulting (2008: 13, 19)
Note: ‘Average year’: 2006 crop production; Belg 2006 market prices
 ‘Inflation year’: Average crop production (2006); Belg 2008 market prices
average or high food prices. FEG notes that: “Because of 
atypical current year conditions, woreda administrations 
in the pilot woredas face high support needs due to high 
staple food prices – which had risen to roughly 300 to 
350% of 2005/06 levels by the 2008 Belg season” (FEG 
Consulting 2008: 10).
Table 9 shows the results of FEG simulations for one 
woreda in SNNP Region. The threefold increase in food 
prices observed in Boricha woreda over two years is 
responsible for a fourfold increase in the numbers of 
people needing assistance to cover their ‘livelihoods 
protection deficit’, from 23,000 to 96,000, or 9% to 38% 
of the woreda population. This is disaggregated into a 
doubling of individuals needing assistance for less than 
3 months, a substantial increase in the numbers needing 
assistance for 3 months, and a new category of individuals 
who would need assistance for 6 months of this particu-
larly difficult year.
From a beneficiary perspective, index-linking cash 
transfers or extending payments in drought years or 
when prices rise is highly desirable, because it upgrades 
the provision of cash transfers from discretionary and 
variable social assistance to a form of quasi-social insur-
ance. However, from an administrator’s perspective this 
would require a degree of flexibility in programme 
design, delivery and (especially) budgeting that is 
extremely challenging. The PSNP cash transfers budget 
would have needed to treble in two years, just to keep 
pace with food price inflation in Ethiopia between 2006 
and 2008.
Nonetheless, our findings confirm that any social 
protection programme that aims to enhance or protect 
household food security must introduce mechanisms 
that buffer social transfers against shocks such as high 
food prices. This would imply a design phase that 
includes: (1) inflation forecasting, (2) assessment of local 
markets, (3) building a contingency fund into programme 
budgets, and (4) taking into account the characteristics 
of different beneficiary groups, before (5) choosing 
between alternative payment modalities.
Implications for policy
This paper has demonstrated that the susceptibility of 
social transfers to price inflation has been under-acknowl-
edged by policy-makers and programme designers 
whose mandate is to deliver ‘predictable transfers to meet 
predictable needs’. If it is to achieve this objective, cash 
transfers must respond to changes in commodity prices 
that undermine purchasing power. Possible responses 
include adjustments to transfer payments, insurance 
mechanisms and price stabilisation measures.
Transfer mechanisms
There are several ways in which social transfer interven-
tions such as the Productive Safety Net Programme could 
be redesigned to be more responsive to food price vari-
ability, including the following, all of which share the 
disadvantage that they require unprecedented flexibility 
by governments and/or donors in terms of instruments 
(cash, food, vouchers) and financing.
Index-link cash transfers to the cost of a basket of basic  •
food and non-food items (as in Malawi’s ‘Food and Cash 
Transfer’ and ‘Dowa Emergency Cash Transfers’ 
projects).
Provide transfers in the form of commodity-denomi- •
nated vouchers. (This has the advantage of guaran-
teeing access to the specified commodities at whatever 
cost, while not undermining market functioning as is 
the risk with direct commodity transfers.)
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Extend the duration of transfers when food prices rise  •
(e.g. from 6 to 9 months, as in the FEG Consulting 
scenario discussed above).
Switch out of cash transfers towards food transfers  •
when cash is devalued by price rises (as has happened 
in several PSNP woredas in Ethiopia).
Provide a combination of cash plus food (as in Lesotho’s  •
‘Cash and Food Transfers Pilot Project’ and Swaziland’s 
‘Emergency Drought Relief’ programme).
Insurance mechanisms
Social transfers can be complemented by mechanisms 
that provide some form of insurance for vulnerable 
households against price rises. Two examples are (1) 
employment guarantee schemes – as in India’s ‘National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme’, which offers up 
to one hundred days of paid work to every rural house-
hold every year, on demand; (2) weather-indexed crop 
insurance schemes – which make payouts to farmers 
when rainfall in an area falls below predetermined 
thresholds, enabling food purchases before prices rise, 
if payouts are timely.
Price stabilisation mechanisms
African governments used to operate a number of 
mechanisms to stabilise food supplies and prices – across 
the country, between seasons and from year to year. 
These included buffer stock management, pan-territorial 
pricing and price banding. Most of these mechanisms 
were abolished under agricultural liberalisation reforms 
during the 1980s and 1990s, but an argument could be 
made to retain or revive some of their positive food 
security features.
Any combination of these measures would provide 
more effective social protection, not just against poverty 
and food insecurity, but also against market failure, 
which is both a characteristic and a cause of vulnerability, 
in Ethiopia and many other low-income food deficit 
countries.
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End Notes
1 All quotations in this section are sourced from 
Devereux et al. 2008.
2 Due to this it would be incorrect to include a public 
works dummy as an explanatory variable of the 
programme effect as the PW participation is in fact part 
of the treatment indicator. Thus, we do not include a 
PW dummy in the final estimations.
3 We re-ran the model excluding the imputation 
dummy and find that the signs and significance of the 
parameter values to not change.
4 This model specification was chosen over an 
alternative that would place LnInc06 on the right hand 
side. The problem with including income as an 
explanatory variable in a household model is that errors 
in variables are large and the coefficient is biased 
towards zero. Thus, our specification has the advantage 
of reducing measurement error on income. Our 
purpose is to obtain a consistent estimator of  1 and we 
know that the dummy variable for beneficiaries does 
not have measurement error. However, our 
specification does place a restriction on prior income, 
such that we assume it follows a unit root process. 
Empirically this is not supported by our data; however, 
the main results of the paper to either model 
specification (constrained or unconstrained) do not 
change. Thus we choose the model that minimises 
measurement error.
5 We performed matching methods and were not able 
to find a match. In particular, the test for the balancing 
properties of the treatment group and the control 
group, based on the observable variables that we had, 
indicated that we were not able to take into account a 
significant proportion of the differences between these 
groups (the pseudo-R-squared after matching did not 
come close to zero).. This meant that we were not able 
to compare participants who were the poorest groups 
targeted by the government with similar non-
participants with these observable characteristics 
because this last group were generally non-poor.  This 
would be an issue of concern to us had we not found 
any programme effects. That is, comparing the 
outcomes of the poor participants with the richer 
non-participants and found no programme effect for 
the former. As shown in the paper we do find 
programme effects even though we have this 
comparison group. 
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